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Abstract
We study optimal bank regulation in an economy with aggregate uncertainty.
Bank liabilities are used as “money” and hence earn lower returns than equity.
In laissez faire equilibrium, banks maximize market value, trading off the funding
advantage of debt against the risk of costly default. The capital structure is not
socially optimal because external costs of distress are not internalized by the banks.
The constrained efficient allocation is characterized as the solution to a planner’s
problem. Efficient regulation is procyclical, but countercyclical relative to laissez
faire. We show that simple leverage constraints can get the decentralized economy
close to the constrained efficient outcome.
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As various authors have pointed out1, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory of
corporate capital structure is not appropriate for understanding the capital structure
of banks. Whereas corporate debt is a claim on corporate cash flows, bank liabilities
circulate as money in addition to being a claim on cash flows. The liquidity services
provided by bank liabilities create a wedge between the risk adjusted returns on bank
debt and bank equity. As a result, debt may be a cheaper source of funding than equity.
In this paper, we undertake a theoretical investigation of optimal bank capital structures
in a model where the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold.
We are interested in studying the dynamics of bank capital structure when the econ-
omy is subject to aggregate shocks. Aggregate uncertainty makes the characterization of
general equilibrium analytically intractable, so we resort to numerical methods to solve
the model. The solution of the model is difficult because we solve the model globally
rather than using a linear approximation around the steady state. Computing a global
solution is necessary because non-linearities play an important role in the model and the
optimal dynamic policy varies across different states.
Another source of complications is the fact that markets are incomplete. Whenever a
bank or firm changes its capital structure, it is effectively creating new securities that are
not spanned by the existing securities. This gives rise to a complicated pricing problem.
The computational problems we face are made tractable by the fact that we have
developed a model that can be solved as the solution to a planner’s problem. The
planner makes the consumption and savings decisions for households and investment
decisions and capital structures for banks and firms that maximize the expected utility
of the representative agent. Then we can use the first-order conditions for the consumers’
problem to “back out” the market clearing prices. The capital structure chosen by the
planner turns out to maximize the market value of banks, when debt and equity are
priced using the appropriate stochastic discount factors. Solving the planner’s problem
is non-trivial, but it greatly simplifies the computational difficulty of solving the model.
We develop a two-sector dynamic equilibrium model consisting of bankers, producers,
and consumers. Bankers raise funds by issuing equity and debt (in the form of deposits)
and invest in capital goods. The bankers’ capital assets produce revenue using a linear,
stochastic technology that is subject to idiosyncratic as well aggregate shocks. Producers
1See, for example, DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) and Stein (2012).
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have a neoclassical technology with decreasing returns to scale for producing new capital
goods. Production is instantaneous and uses only consumption as an input, so there is
no need for producers to obtain financing for production. The producers are assumed
to maximize profits, which are immediately paid to the owners (consumers).
There is a large number of identical, infinitely lived consumers. Consumers have
an initial endowment of capital goods, which they sell to bankers in exchange for debt
(deposits) and equity. From that point onwards, consumers receive the returns on debt
and equity and manage their portfolios to maximize their expected utility over an infinite
horizon.
A banker chooses the capital structure that maximizes the market value of the bank
at each date. This entails a tradeoff between the funding advantage of debt and the
risk of costly default.2 This tradeoff determines a unique, optimal, capital structure in
equilibrium. The optimal capital structure changes over time, of course. Without the
funding advantage of debt, 100% equity finance would be optimal; without the risk of
costly default, 100% debt finance would be optimal. We need both the funding advantage
of debt and costs of default to explain a non-trivial capital structure.
A limitation of our approach is that there is no need for capital regulation. Be-
cause the equilibrium is a solution of the planner’s problem, an equilibrium allocation
is constrained efficient.3 One of the main reasons for studying bank capital structures,
of course, is the belief that banks are over-levered and that stricter capital regulation is
required to make the banking system more resilient and avoid financial crises.
We have two answers to this concern. First, studying a constrained efficient equilib-
rium may be useful for understanding regulation. It provides a benchmark by showing
how capital structures would behave in an ideal world. This may provide some guidance
to regulators who are trying to figure out what bank capital structures should look like.
We give some examples below. Our second response is to extend the model to include
external costs of bank distress. As long as those costs are additively separable, the equi-
2For simplicity, we assume that default results in bankruptcy and the loss of a fixed fraction of the
bank’s revenue. These costs are internalized by the banker and represent a deadweight loss for the
economy.
3Because markets are incomplete (debt and equity are the only claims on the banks’ cash flows), the
appropriate efficiency concept is constrained efficiency. In addition to the usual feasibility conditions,
the planner is required to use debt and equity to share risk and allocate consumption. This includes
the requirement that only deposits can be used to pay for consumption.
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librium of the laisser faire economy can still be computed as the solution of a planner’s
problem. This planner’s problem ignores the external costs, so the resulting equilibrium
is no longer constrained efficient. The socially optimal allocation, including the socially
optimal capital structures, must be derived from a different planner’s problem, one that
includes the additively separable external costs.
A good illustration of these two approaches is the behavior of bank leverage over
the business cycle. In both the laissez faire equilibrium (equilibrium, hereafter) and
the optimal solution of the planner’s program (optimum, hereafter) in the presence of
a negative externality, leverage is strongly procyclical. In both cases, an increase in
productivity leads to an increase in leverage in the banking sector. This contradicts
the view that capital regulation should be countercyclical, that is, requiring more bank
capital at the peak of the cycle than at the trough.4 The relationship between the
optimum and equilibrium leverage is highly non-linear, however. When productivity and
output are low, the difference between the equilibrium bank leverage and the optimal
bank leverage is negligible. When productivity is high, on the other hand, optimal
leverage is much lower than equilibrium leverage. In fact, the ratio of optimum leverage
to equilibrium leverage decreases monotonically as productivity increases. So, although
optimal leverage is procyclical, the policy is countercyclical in the sense that optimal
regulation restricts leverage relatively more compared to the equilibrium at the top
of the cycle than at the bottom. Thus, the model produces two surprising results,
the optimality of procyclical leverage together with a non-linear countercyclical policy
of “leaning against the wind.” These subtleties would not be observable in a linear
approximation of the model, of course.
Another interesting feature of the model’s dynamics is what we call the intertemporal
substitution effect. This is most clearly seen when we shut down the aggregate produc-
tivity shocks and observe the transition of the economy from some initial condition to
the steady state. Because of the negative externality associated with leverage, we expect
leverage to be lower in the optimum than it is in the equilibrium. However, this poses a
problem for the planner: reducing leverage will restrict consumption, other things being
equal, and increase investment. But what is the point of investing more if the returns
cannot be consumed? In fact, it is not optimal to reduce leverage at every point on
the growth path. Initially, leverage and the bank’s default probability are higher in the
4Gersbach and Rochet (2017) provides a rationale for countercyclical policy in this traditional sense.
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optimum than in the equilibrium. Then, when the capital stock has grown sufficiently
large, leverage and the probability of default level off in the optimum, but continue to
grow on the equilibrium path and eventually overtake the constrained efficient leverage
and default probability. This behavior is a consequence of the fact that the negative
externality is linear in the capital stock whereas the marginal utility of consumption is
diminishing as the capital stock and consumption grow. When the economy is small,
the marginal external cost is relatively unimportant compared to the marginal utility of
consumption. As the economy approaches the steady state, the marginal external cost
remains the same while marginal utility has become relatively small.
Once we re-introduce aggregate productivity shocks, the model no longer has a steady
state, but it has an ergodic set and we can see the intertemporal substitution effect at
work here as well. Along the transition to a steady state, it is optimal to increase
leverage when capital and consumption are low and reduce it when they are high. The
same intuition suggests that, in the ergodic set, optimal leverage should be relatively
high when productivity is low and relatively low when productivity is high. And this
is exactly what we see when we compare leverage in the equilibrium and optimum: the
ratio of optimal to equilibrium leverage is countercyclical.
In the presence of the negative externality, the constrained efficient solution to the
planner’s problem is the best that can be achieved, but it goes beyond what could
be interpreted as capital regulation because it requires the regulator to control every
aspect of the economy. Unfortunately, there is no way to decentralize decisions about
consumption, investment, and portfolios choice, while leaving regulation of bank capital
structure to the central authority. Even if such a decentralization result were available,
the fully state-contingent optimal capital regulation might be so complex that it would
be unrealistic to expect a regulator, with limited computational ability and information,
to implement it.
As an alternative to the central planning solution, we model the behavior of a bound-
edly rational regulator, while leaving everything else to be determined as in the laissez
faire equilibrium, in the form of an ad hoc rule that approximates the optimal leverage
policy derived from the planner’s problem. In the simplest case, this reduced-form reg-
ulation takes the form of a constant, state-independent, upper bound on leverage. A
more sophisticated version allows for the upper bound on leverage to vary with aggregate
productivity. In this way, we try to mimic a fixed maximum leverage ratio and a pro-
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cyclical maximum leverage ratio. These constraints on leverage are imposed exogenously
on banks, but producers and consumers are not directly constrained. They make their
equilibrium decisions in the usual way, taking prices as given, and then prices adjust to
clear markets. We refer to an equilibrium relative to an exogenous regulatory rule as a
regulated equilibrium.5
Our analysis of the various regulated equilibria shows that a simple policy can be
quite effective in certain circumstances. If we shut down the aggregate productivity
shock and set the maximum leverage equal to the steady state leverage in the optimum,
the regulated equilibrium with this constant, state-independent maximum leverage looks
pretty similar to the optimum. Along the transition path, the leverage constraint is not
binding but the unconstrained leverage is close to the constrained efficient leverage. Once
we get close to the steady state, the constraint begins to bind and regulated equilibrium
is forced to follow the same path as in the optimum.
Although this very simple policy does well if we set the upper bound equal to the
constrained efficient leverage in steady state, the results are sensitive to the choice of
policy. Choosing a slightly lower upper bound causes the economy to overshoot the
constrained efficient steady state and accumulate too much capital. Although this means
that consumption will eventually be higher in the steady state, the path as a whole is
inefficient and, in the steady state, consumption and welfare could both be raised by
reducing the capital stock through depreciation.
A constant maximum leverage ratio does well in the absence of aggregate uncertainty,
but it would be less successful in an economy with aggregate uncertainty. We know
that the optimal leverage is strongly procyclical. A constant maximum leverage ratio
is either never binding or prevents leverage from rising enough when productivity is
high. On the other hand, a state-contingent policy can do quite well. Although the
optimum leverage depends on two state variables, the capital stock and the productivity
shock, it is sufficient to make the maximum leverage in the regulated equilibrium a
function of the productivity shock alone. Setting the maximum leverage equal to the
expected leverage in the optimum, conditional on the productivity shock, we find that
the regulated equilibrium is very close to the optimum.
5Admittedly, the models of regulation we analyze are suboptimal and ad hoc. Nonetheless, it is
interesting to see how close one can come to the first best using such simple, ad hoc rules.
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One of the advantages of the regulated equilibrium is that we can see the effect of
capital regulation on market prices. In particular, we can see how the relative costs of
debt equity funding are affected. Again, the cleanest results are obtained for the model
in which the aggregate productivity shock is shut down and we consider a constant,
state-independent maximum leverage ratio. When the capital stock is low, the returns
to debt and equity are quite high and very similar. As the economy grows, approaching
the steady state, the returns on debt and equity fall and drift apart. The steady-state
returns on equity are determined by the consumers’ discount factor, as they would be in
any neoclassical growth model. The return on deposits, however, is much lower because
of the liquidity premium on deposits. The spread between the returns on debt and equity
is also very sensitive to the leverage constraint. A slight tightening of the constraint
can drive the return on deposits into negative territory. In the model with aggregate
uncertainty, the price dynamics are more complicated, but we continue to see significant
differences between the cost debt and equity funding and significant sensitivity to capital
regulation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we discuss the contribution
of our analysis vis-a-vis the extant literature. In Sections 2-4, we introduce the dynamic
equilibrium model of economy with a banking sector and derive the fundamental de-
centralization results, which are instrumental to our analysis. Section 5 introduces our
models of bank regulation. In Section 6 we discuss the numerical results of our models.
1 Literature review
As highlighted in Galati and Moessner (2013), the financial crisis of 2007-09 exposed
important shortcomings in our understanding of the nexus between the real economy, the
financial system, and monetary policy ( Crowe, Johnson, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer 2010,
Claessens, Kose, Laeven, and Valencia 2014). Also, externalities play a crucial role in the
design of macroprudential policies (De Nicolo`, Favara, and Ratnovski 2012), but much
of the literature does not consider these externalities or focuses on a representative bank.
Our paper fills these gaps proposing the study of optimal, dynamic, capital regulation
in an economy subject to aggregate productivity shocks, when bank liabilities circulate
as money but leverage of the banking sector creates a negative externality.
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There is now a substantial literature on macroeconomic models with financial fric-
tions. Recently, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) consider a macroeconomic model of bank
runs in which the supply of bank capital is fixed. Thus, the cost of capital does not
play an important role in determining the equilibrium capital structure. Similarly, in
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), the quantity of bank capital changes due to macro
shocks and evolves according to a two-factor stochastic equation. Their model assumes
also that the debt risk free. In the models of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Brunner-
meier and Sannikov (2014), the level of consumption is not a choice variable, making
prices independent of consumption. These models have the merit of including a styl-
ized financial sector, although without developing a theory of asset pricing. Unlike the
macroeconomic literature, our paper focuses on the pricing of debt and equity and the
impact on financial decisions, such as the choice of the equilibrium capital structure,
rather than the role of financial frictions in the business cycle.
A second strand of literature studies optimal bank capital structure. Allen, Carletti,
and Marquez (2015) study a simple general equilibrium model in which banks and firms
are funded by debt and equity and choose their capital structures to maximize joint
surplus. In equilibrium they show that banks have much higher leverage than firms.
Gale and Gottardi (2017) generalize the results of Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2015),
showing that similar results can be obtained in a standard competitive equilibrium
model without their restrictive assumptions. They argue that bank leverage can be
higher because the equity buffer held by firms does “double duty,” making the firms’
debt safer and thus making banks safer. In an important quantitative study, Gornal and
Strebulaev (2015) also study the general equilibrium determination of capital structures
in the corporate and banking sectors. They show that for reasonable parameter values,
leverage is much higher in the banking sector than in the corporate sector. They argue
that banks assets are safer for two reasons, because they are senior claims and because
the bank is diversified across firms. In the present paper, we combine the banking and
corporate sectors, following the approach in Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2015). And
unlike the static models discussed above, our focus is on the dynamics of capital structure
and prices driven by aggregate shocks.
Admati and Hellwig (2013) base their argument that “bank capital cannot be expen-
sive” on the seminal Modigliani and Miller (1958) paper on corporate capital structure.
However, banks are special, as DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) point out. Banks provide liq-
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uidity services, that is, they are engaged in security design, and cannot take the prices of
securities as given. Instead, the banker takes as given the marginal utility that the rep-
resentative consumer will receive in each state, in each subperiod, and uses the marginal
utilities to value the bundle of contingent commodities represented by the securities. In
this way, banks provide liquidity insurance to depositors who wish to postpone consump-
tion (Diamond and Dibvig 1983). It is important to note that the optimal level of capital
and the leverage structure of the bank along the business cycle is not explored here. In
an early paper, Gale (2004) studied the endogenous choice of bank capital structure to
provide additional risk sharing to depositors. Again, among the channels of interaction
between the banking sector and the real economy, these papers do not consider the role
of consumption. An exception is Gale and Yorulmazer (2016), who highlight the social
value of deposits and the banks’ equilibrium capital structure is determined, similarly
to our model, by a trade off between the funding advantages of deposits and the risk of
costly default.
A third research strand examines the optimality of bank regulation and, in recent
times the welfare effect of capital and liquidity requirements. A first analysis of opti-
mality and the rationality of banking regulation is in Gale and Ozgur (2005).
In order to find an externality that justifies the introduction of capital regulation,
one has to go beyond the microeconomic analysis of a single bank and consider the
efficiency of risk sharing in the financial sector or the economy as a whole. Financial
fragility is one possible justification. A recent review of the literature is provided by
Marttynova (2015). She reviews studies exploring how higher bank capital requirements
affect economic growth. The study shows that the way banks meet capital requirements
(raise equity, cutting down lending, and reducing asset risk) matters and finds that both
theoretical and empirical studies are inconclusive as to whether more stringent capital
requirements reduce banks’ risk-taking and make lending safer.
De Nicolo`, Gamba, and Lucchetta (2014) develop a dynamic model to study the
quantitative impact of microprudential bank regulations on bank lending. The model
assesses the efficiency and welfare of banks that are financed by debt and equity, un-
dertake maturity transformation, are exposed to credit and liquidity risks, and face
financing frictions. They show that the relationship between bank lending, welfare, and
capital requirements is concave. More importantly, they argue that resolution policies
contingent on observed capital, such as prompt corrective action, dominate in efficiency
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and welfare terms (non-contingent) capital and liquidity requirements. Relative to this
literature, one of our most important contributions is that efficient capital regulation
is procyclical and that a state-contingent leverage constraint can get the decentralized
economy close to the constrained efficient outcome.
Van den Heuvel (2008, 2016) analyze the welfare cost of capital requirement. His
model, like ours, assumes that banks liabilities provide liquidity in an otherwise standard
general equilibrium growth setting. He analyzes how capital requirements can affect
capital accumulation and the size of the banking sector when there is a tradeoff between
the benefit of bank’s deposits and the cost of capital requirement and supervision. He
argues capital requirements are very costly in terms of welfare (between 0.1 and 1 per
cent of the US GDP) because an increase in the capital requirement lowers welfare
by reducing the ability of banks to issue deposit-type liabilities. On the other hand,
capital requirements reduce bank supervision and the related compliance costs, given
the incentive compatibility constraint. While this may be an important factor, in our
model we consider a genuine market failure: the typical bank, being small, does not take
into account the negative externality of the overall banking sector leverage.
Differently from recent contributions, our model explicitly assumes macroeconomic
risk as the main driver. Van den Heuvel (2008, 2016) assumes no aggregate uncertainty.
In Boissay, Collard, and Smets (2016), recessions arise from a coordination failure be-
tween heterogeneous banks, as opposed to from aggregate uncertainty. They use a
simple textbook general equilibrium model, in which banking crises result from the pro-
cyclicality of bank balance sheets that originates from interbank market funding. In
their model, a crisis breaks out endogenously, following a credit boom generated by a
sequence of small positive supply shocks; it does not result from a large negative exoge-
nous shock. Thus, a procyclical regulation would not be optimal in their setting, as the
banks, through the interbank channel, would have problems with reciprocal funding.
Also Phelan (2016) attributes macroeconomic instability to the financial sector. He
derives a continuous-time stochastic general equilibrium model in which banks allocate
resources to productive projects, and bank deposits provide liquidity services. Bank
capital is set with a VaR rule, similarly to Adrian and Shin (2014), that makes lever-
age procyclical because asset’s risk is higher in downturns. Phelan shows that although
financial-sector leverage increases social efficiency in the short run, in the long run it
increases the frequency and duration of states with bad economic outcomes. Hence,
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according to Phelan, there is a linkage between procyclicality of leverage and financial
instability. While this literature argues that the procyclicality of bank leverage is detri-
mental to welfare, we show that the leverage in the constrained efficient economy is
procyclical.
2 The model
In this section, we introduce the model of competitive equilibrium that provides the
framework for the rest of the paper. We characterize the optimal allocation as the so-
lution to a planner’s problem and show that the constrained efficient allocation can be
decentralized as a laissez faire equilibrium. This approach has two advantages. First, it
allows us to compute the equilibrium allocation as the solution to a dynamic program-
ming problem. Second, it implies that the equilibrium allocation is constrained efficient.
The equilibrium prices can then be backed out from the first-order conditions of the
representative consumer, evaluated at the equilibrium allocation.
Time is assumed to be discrete and is indexed by t = 0, 1 . . . . At each date t,
there are two goods, a perishable consumption good and a durable capital good. The
consumption good is used as the sole input for the production of capital goods. The
capital good is used as the sole input for the production of consumption goods.
The economy consists of consumers, bankers, and producers. Consumers are the
initial owners of capital goods, which they sell to bankers in exchange for deposits and
equity. Consumers manage a portfolio of deposits and equity to fund lifetime consump-
tion. They also own the firms that produce capital goods.
Bankers control the technology for producing consumption goods. They fund the
purchase of capital goods by issuing debt (deposits) and equity. Constant returns to
scale and perfect competition ensure that bankers maximize the market value of their
banks but receive no remuneration in return. The bankers pay depositors principal
and interest from their revenues. The rest is earnings on equity which can be paid to
shareholders as dividends or retained and invested in assets (capital goods). Banks are
subject to revenue shocks, which introduce the possibility of default. If a bank has
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insufficient funds to meet the demand for withdrawals, it is forced into liquidation and
settles its debts from the sale of its assets (capital goods).
Producers use a neoclassical technology to produce capital goods. Since production
takes place instantantaneously and does not involve capital as an input, there is no need
for the producers to finance their operations with debt and equity. They choose inputs
and outputs to maximize current profits. Profits are immediately distributed to the
owners (consumers).
2.1 Market structure
A key assumption in our model is that markets and activities are segmented. The interval
[t, t+ 1), referred to as period t, is divided into two subperiods, which we call ‘morning ’
and ‘afternoon.’ Some markets are open only in the morning; other markets are open
only in the afternoon. This segregation of markets naturally leads to a segregation of
activities between the morning and afternoon, as well. The time line is as follows:
• morning of period [t, t+ 1):
– the aggregate productivity shock and the bankers’ idiosyncratic shocks are
realized;
– bankers’ cash flows are realized;
– consumers withdraw deposits from banks;
– deposits that are not used for consumption can be held until the afternoon;
• afternoon of period [t, t+ 1):
– solvent banks pay dividends to shareholders;
– failed banks are liquidated and their debts settled;
– new capital goods are produced and sold to banks;
– banks issue debt and equity to finance the purchase of new capital goods and
to optimize their capital structures;
– consumers purchase new debt and equity and rebalance their portfolios.
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This structure forces consumers who want to consume in the morning of period t + 1
to acquire deposits in the afternoon of period t. A consumer who receives dividends in
the afternoon of period t, cannot consume them immediately. Instead, the dividends
must be converted into deposits, which cannot be consumed until the morning of period
t+ 1.6
The segregation of activities between subperiods gives deposits a role as a medium
of exchange as well as a store of wealth. Deposits are not simply another asset: they
have social value because they make consumption possible. As we shall see, deposits
are a cheaper source of funding for banks than equity, because of the liquidity services
provided by deposits.
The segregation of activities also explains why banks that are short of ‘cash’ to pay
their depositors cannot obtain additional liquidity by selling part of their capital stock.
The market for capital goods is open in the afternoon, but not in the morning.
2.2 Consumers
There is a unit mass of identical and infinitely lived consumers. A consumer begins
life with k0 units of capital goods at date 0 that he sells to bankers in exchange for
deposits and equity. We assume there is no consumption or production at date 0, which
serves only as an opportunity for consumers to sell capital goods and for bankers to buy
capital goods and choose their initial capital structure, that is, the amount of deposits
and equity they issue in exchange for capital goods.
Consumer preferences are given by the standard, additively separable utility function
∞∑
t=1
βtu (ct) ,
6Consumption goods are perishable and cannot be stored between periods. In any case, deposits
are more efficient than storage, because bankers invest deposits in productive capital goods, which are
productive.
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where 0 < β < 1 is the common discount factor, ct denotes consumption at date t and
u (ct) is the utility from consumption ct. The function u (·) is assumed to satisfy the
usual neoclassical properties:
u : R+ → R is C2 and u′ (c) > 0 and u′′ (c) < 0, for all c ≥ 0.
Consumers manage a portfolio of deposits and equity to provide the optimal con-
sumption stream over their infinite horizon. As we shall see, the return on (fully diver-
sified) deposits is always lower than the return on equity.
2.3 Bankers
There is a unit mass of bankers represented by the interval [0, 1]. Each banker i ∈ [0, 1]
receives two productivity shocks at date t, an idiosyncratic shock θit and a systemic or
aggregate shock At. One unit of capital produces θitAt units of the consumption good
in the morning of period t. We assume that the random variables {θit} are i.i.d. across
i and t. Let F (θ) denote the c.d.f. of the random variables {θit}. We assume that F is
continuous and increasing on [0, Z], with F (0) = 0 and F (Z) = 1. We assume the shock
At takes a finite number of values, At ∈ A = {a1, ..., an}, and has a stationary transition
probability, p (At+1|At) > 0, for every At, At+1 ∈ A. Without loss of generality, we can
order the shock values so that a1 < a2 < ... < an.
Because there is a large number of bankers and the productivity shocks are i.i.d.,
we assume that the cross-sectional distribution of shocks is the same as the probability
distribution F . Thus, for any θ, the fraction of banks that receive a shock θit ≤ θ is
F (θ). In particular, this means that the “law of large numbers” convention is satisfied,
so ∫ 1
0
θitdi = E [θit] ,
at every date t. Because we are interested in the aggregate behavior of bankers, we drop
the subscript i in what follows and use θt to denote the generic value of the productivity
shock to a representative banker.
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Bankers fund the purchase of capital goods by issuing debt (deposits) and equity.
One unit of deposits purchased at date t has a face value of ztkt at date t + 1,
7 where
each bank is holding kt units of capital goods at the end of period t.
By issuing debt, the banks expose themselves to the risk of default. In the morning
of period t + 1, a bank produces θt+1At+1kt units of the good. If the bank has issued
deposits with face value less than or equal to θt+1At+1kt, it can redeem the deposits in
full. Otherwise, it is in default. In the event of default, the bank incurs additional costs
associated with bankruptcy. These costs are assumed to take the form of a fraction
0 < δ < 1 of output that is lost when the bank defaults.
2.4 Producers
The technology for producing capital goods is subject to decreasing returns to scale. An
input of I ≥ 0 units of the consumption good produces ϕ (I) units of the capital good
instantaneously:
ϕ is C1 on (0,∞) , ϕ′ (I) > 0 and ϕ′′ (I) < 0, for I > 0, and lim
I↘0
ϕ′ (I) =∞.
The production of capital goods is instantaneous, so no finance is required. If produc-
ers choose as inputs It units of consumption and produce ϕ (It) units of capital goods,
the revenue is vtϕ (It), where vt is the price of capital goods in terms of consumption,
and the profit is vtϕ (It)− It. The producers maximize profits each period:
pit = sup
It≥0
{vtϕ (It)− It} ,
Profits are immediately distributed to the firm’s owners (consumers).
2.5 The banker’s problem
Competition for capital goods forces bankers to maximize the market value of the secu-
rities, debt (deposits) and equity, that they issue. Two bankers with the same capital
7Because of the linearity of the bankers’ technology, we scale everything by the size of the capital
stock, which allows us to express the equilibrium conditions independently of kt.
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stock have the same production capabilities and hence the same potential value. The
only choice variable they control is their capital structure, which determines the risk of
default and the division of returns between debt and equity. The bank with the better
capital structure will have a higher market value, which allows the banker to bid more
for the available assets (capital goods). In equilibrium, competition drives up the price
of capital goods until the market value of the securities issued is just equal to the value
of the assets purchased, leaving nothing for the banker himself.
Although a bank may survive for many periods, the banker only needs to look one
period ahead when choosing the optimal capital structure. Because the capital structure
can be changed at the end of each period, the effect of the banker’s choice of capital
structure in the afternoon of period t lasts only until the afternoon of period t+ 1, and
the market value of the securities issued depends only on the income earned in period t
and the stock of depreciated capital goods that remains at the end of the period.
The capital structure chosen by a banker with kt units of capital goods is determined
by the face value of deposits, ztkt, issued in the afternoon of period t. The bank will be
in default if and only if the revenue, θt+1At+1kt, realized in the morning of period t+ 1
is less than ztkt. The bank’s total returns consist of the value of deposits in the morning
of period t + 1, the returns of equity holders in the afternoon of period t + 1, and the
value of the depreciated capital goods remaining at the end of period t + 1. Since the
depreciated capital stock, (1− γ) kt, is independent of the banker’s decision, it can be
ignored for present purposes. Since banks operate subject to constant returns to scale,
there is no loss of generality in considering the case of a bank that operates with one
unit of capital goods and deposits with face value zt.
Depositors will diversify their deposits across all banks, thereby eliminating idiosyn-
cratic risk. They are still subject to losses from default, however. A deposit in a bank
with an idiosyncratic shock θt+1 < zt/At+1 in state At+1 is worth (1− δ)At+1θt+1. A
deposit in a bank with an idiosyncratic shock θt+1 ≥ zt/At+1 in state At+1 is worth zt.
The expected value of a deposit in the representative bank, which is equal to the actual
yield from a diversified portfolio of deposits, will be
At+1 (1− δ)
∫ zt
At+1
0
θt+1dF + zt
(
1− F
(
zt
At+1
))
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in state At+1. The returns of the equity holders, leaving aside the depreciated capital
goods, are
At+1
∫ Z
zt
At+1
(
θt+1 − zt
At+1
)
dF.
The characteristics of debt (deposits) and equity issued by the bank are determined
by the bank’s capital structure. For this reason, the banker cannot take the prices of
securities as given. Instead, the banker takes as given the marginal utility of represen-
tative consumer in each state and in each subperiod, and uses the marginal utilities to
value the securities. For each state At+1 ∈ A, let m1 (At+1) (resp. m2 (At+1)) denote
the marginal utility of consumption in the morning (resp. afternoon) of the following
period if the productivity shock is At+1. The market value of the securities is equal to
the weighted sum of the returns on deposits and equity:
∑
At+1
[
m1 (At+1)
(
At+1 (1− δ)
∫ zt
At+1
0
θt+1dF + zt
(
1− F
(
zt
At+1
)))
+
m2 (At+1)At+1
∫ Z
zt
At+1
(
θt+1 − zt
At+1
)
dF
]
p (At+1|At) .
The banker will choose the face value of deposits zt per unit of capital to maximize the
market value of the bank’s securities.
2.6 The consumer’s problem
In the afternoon of period t, the representative consumer divides his wealth between
deposits and equity. A unit of deposits is a claim on a deposit with face value zt and a
unit of equity is a residual claim on the bank with one unit of capital goods and deposits
with face value zt. The consumer purchases dtkt units of deposits at the price qt and
purchases etkt units of bank equity at the price rt. One unit of deposits diversified across
all banks yields λt+1 (At+1) in the morning of period t+ 1, where
λt+1 (At+1) = At+1 (1− δ)
∫ zt
At+1
0
θt+1dF + zt
(
1− F
(
zt
At+1
))
,
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in state At+1. The consumer’s budget constraint in the morning of period t+ 1 is
ct+1 ≤ dtλt+1 (At+1) kt.
The consumer chooses ct+1 (At+1), subject to the liquidity constraint as part of its max-
imization problem. The constraint may be binding for some values of At+1 and non-
binding for others. When the constraint is not binding, the amount dtλt+1 (At+1) kt −
ct+1 (At+1) is carried over to the afternoon and is used to purchase equity or retained as
deposit.
Depositors also have a claim on the capital stock of failed banks that is realized in the
afternoon of period t+ 1. Let µt+1 (At+1) denote the value paid by one unit of deposits
in the afternoon of period t+ 1, where
µt+1 (At+1) =
∫ zt
At+1
0
min {zt − (1− δ)At+1θt+1, vt+1 (1− γ)} dF.
The depositors receive either the total value of the failed bank’s capital, vt+1 (1− γ) kt,
or the difference between the face value of deposits and what they actually received,
zt − (1− δ)At+1θt+1, whichever is less.
In the afternoon of period t + 1, the equity holders are owners of all of the leftover
capital, (1− γ) kt, and of the retained earnings of the firms minus what was paid to the
depositors in settlement of the bankrupt firms. Let Rt+1 (At+1) denote the total return
to one unit of equity in the afternoon of period t + 1. Then the equity holders receive
etRt+1kt in the afternoon of period t+ 1, where
Rt+1 (At+1) = vt+1 (1− γ) + At+1
∫ Z
zt
At+1
(
θt+1 − zt
At+1
)
dF − µt+1 (At+1) .
In the afternoon of period t + 1, a consumer with deposits dtkt receives the settlement
µt+1dtkt from failed banks plus the value of deposits not consumed λt+1dtkt − ct+1. As
a shareholder with equity etkt, the consumer has a total return etRt+1kt. A consumer
also receives the profits from production of capital goods pit+1. Thus, the wealth of
a consumer with a portfolio (dtkt, etkt) is λt+1dtkt + µt+1dtkt + Rt+1etkt + pit+1. The
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consumer purchases new deposits dt+1kt+1 and equity et+1kt+1 at a cost of qt+1dt+1kt+1+
rt+1et+1kt+1, so the budget constraint is
qt+1dt+1kt+1 + rt+1et+1kt+1 ≤ λt+1dtkt − ct+1 + µt+1dtkt +Rt+1etkt + pit+1.
The consumer’s problem is to choose a sequence {(ct, dt, et)}∞t=0 to maximize
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct)
]
subject to the constraints
(ct, dt, et) ≥ 0 for any t,
c0 = 0 and q0d0k0 + r0e0k0 ≤ k0,
ct+1 ≤ λt+1dtkt for any t,
ct+1 + qt+1dt+1kt+1 + rt+1et+1kt+1 ≤ dt (λt+1 + µt+1) kt + etRt+1kt + pit+1, for any t.
2.7 The producer’s problem
The producers choose the level of investment It ≥ 0 to maximize profit vtϕ (It) − It at
each date and state. The first order condition
vtϕ
′ (It)− 1 ≤ 0 and (vtϕ′ (It)− 1) It = 0
is necessary and sufficient for profit maximization. The Inada conditions ensure that
It > 0 at each date and state, so we can ensure the producers choose the correct value
of investment It by choosing vt to satisfy
vtϕ
′ (It) = 1,
at every date and state.
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2.8 Equilibrium
An allocation is a non-negative stochastic process {(ct, dt, et, It, kt, zt)}, where at each
date t, ct denotes consumption, dtkt is the demand for deposits, etkt is the demand for
shares, It is investment in new capital goods, kt is the capital stock and zt is the face
value of deposits supplied by banks. An allocation {(ct, dt, et, It, kt, zt)} is attainable if
(i) c0 = 0, and ct ≤ λtdt−1kt−1, for any t > 0,
(ii) (dt, et) = (1, 1) , for any t ≥ 0,
(iii) I0 = 0 and ct + It = Atkt−1
(∫ Z
0
θdF − ∫ zt−1At0 δθdF) , for any t > 0,
(iv) kt+1 = (1− γ) kt + ϕ (It) , for any t > 0.
(1)
A price system is a non-negative stochastic process {(qt, rt, vt)}, where at each date t,
qt is the price of deposits, rt is the price of equity, vt is the price of capital goods. An
equilibrium consists of an attainable allocation {(c∗t , d∗t , e∗t , I∗t , k∗t , z∗t )} and a price system
{(q∗t , r∗t , v∗t )} such that the following conditions are satisfied.
(i) Consumer optimality {(c∗t , d∗t , e∗t )} solves the consumer’s problem.
(ii) Banker optimality {z∗t } solves the banker’s problem at each date t.
(iii) Producer optimality {I∗t } solves the producer’s problem at each date t.
3 Constrained efficiency
An attainable allocation is constrained efficient if there is no other attainable allocation
that makes the representative consumer better off. In other words, a constrained effi-
cient allocation is an attainable allocation that maximizes the expected utility of the
representative consumer subject to the attainability constraints in (1). A constrained
efficient allocation can therefore be characterized as the solution of a planner’s problem.
Because the maximization problem is stationary, it can be put in the form of a recursive
and stationary dynamic programming problem. Because period t is divided into two
subperiods, morning and afternoon, the planner’s problem could begin in either sub-
period. For our purposes, it is convenient to think of the planner making his decision
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in the afternoon. The state of the system in the afternoon of date t is given by the
productivity shock At realized in the morning and the capital stock kt that exists in the
afternoon. Given the state (At, kt), the planner chooses the face value of the debt in
the banks’ capital structure and the next period’s consumption, investment, and capital
stock. The face value of the debt is determined by zt, given the state (At, kt). The
consumption, investment and capital stock for the next period will all depend on the
future productivity shock At+1 and the current state (At, kt). So we denote the consump-
tion, investment and capital stock by c (At+1), I (At+1) and k (At+1), respectively, taking
the value of (kt, At) as given. Using the notation with prime to denote period-(t + 1)
variables and without prime for period-t variables, we can state the planner’s dynamic
programming problem as follows:
V (k,A) = max
(c,I,k,z)
∑
A′∈A
β {u (c (A′)) + V (k (A′) , A′)} p (A′|A) (2)
subject to the constraints
(c, I,k, z) ≥ 0, (3)
c (A′) ≤ λ (A′) k, for any A′ ∈ A (4)
c (A′) + I (A′) ≤ A′k
∫ Z
0
θdF − A′k
∫ z
A′
0
δθdF, for any A′ ∈ A (5)
k (A′) ≤ (1− γ) k + ϕ (I (A′)) , for any A′ ∈ A. (6)
Because an increase in the capital stock always increases the value function V (k,A),
the constraints (5) and (6) will always holds as equalities. Then the next period’s
investment is given by
I (A′) = A′k
∫ Z
0
θdF − A′k
∫ z
A′
0
δθdF − c(A′)
and the capital stock is given by k (A′) = (1− γ) k+ϕ (I (A′)), for each A′. This implies
that the planner has two non-trivial choices to make. He has to choose the face value of
the debt z and divide the total output between consumption and the capital stock.
Proposition 1. Suppose that (c∗, I∗,k∗, z∗)  0 is a feasible solution of the planner’s
dynamic programming problem, that is, it satisfies the constraints (3)–(6) and that the
value function V (·;A′) is concave and C1 for each A′. Then (c∗, I∗,k∗, z∗) is an optimal
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solution of the planner’s problem defined by (2)–(6) if and only if it satisfies the first
order conditions
βu′ (c∗ (A′)) = `∗1 (A
′) + `∗2 (A
′)ϕ′ (I∗ (A′)) , ∀A′ ∈ A, (7)
β
∂
∂k
V (A′, k∗ (A′)) = `∗2 (A
′) , ∀A′ ∈ A, (8)∑
A′
βu′ (c∗ (A′))
δz∗
A′
F ′
(
z∗
A′
)
p (A′|A) =
∑
A′
`∗1 (A
′)
(
1− F
(
z∗
A′
))
p (A′|A) , (9)
for some positive multipliers `∗1 (A
′) and `∗2 (A
′).
Proof. All proofs are collected in the appendix.
4 Competitive equilibrium
In this section we show that the solution to the planner’s dynamic programming prob-
lem can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium. Because the planner’s problem is
recursive, the equilibrium will also be recursive. The planner’s problem determines the
values of consumption, investment, the capital stock, and the capital structure parameter
at each date, in each state. To specify the attainable allocation for a recursive equilib-
rium, we just have to set dt = et = 1 for each date and state. Then it remains to specify
the prices (qt, rt, vt) for each date and state so that consumers, bankers and producers
solve their respective optimization problems by choosing the appropriate quantities.
4.1 The consumer’s problem
The first step is to show that the prices of deposits and equity can be chosen so that
consumers choose dt = et = 1 at each date and state. The state at date t is (k,A),
where k is the capital stock carried forward to date t + 1 and A is the productivity of
capital in date t. The state at date t + 1 is denoted (k′, A′). As usual, q and r are the
respective prices of deposits and equity and d and e are the respective quantities of debt
and equity chosen, in the afternoon of date t. We suppress the reference to the initial
state (k,A) in what follows, but obviously the prices, q and r, and the quantitities, e and
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d, are functions of the initial state. We introduce a variable s to represent the amount
of wealth the consumer has to invest at the end of date t. In equilibrium, s = vk, but
the consumer does not take this into account.
The consumer’s objective function in the afternoon of date t is∑
At+1
{βu (c (A′)) + βV (s (A′) ; k (A′) , A′)} p (A′|A) ,
where V (s (A′) ; k (A′) , A′) is the expected utility of a consumer with wealth s (A′) in
the afternoon of date t + 1, when the state is (k (A′) , A′). In the afternoon of date t, a
consumer with wealth s chooses a portfolio (dk, ek), consisting of dk units of deposits
and ek units of equity. One unit of deposits purchased in the afternoon of date t pays
λ (A′) k in the morning of date t + 1 and µ (A′) k in the afternoon of date t + 1. One
unit of equity yields R (A′) k units of goods in the afternoon of date t+ 1. The portfolio
(dk, ek) yields consumption
c (A′) ≤ λ (A′) dk
in the morning of date t+ 1 and wealth
µ (A′) dk +R (A′) ek
in the afternoon of date t+ 1.
The consumer’s decision problem in the afternoon of t is to choose (d, e, c, s) to solve
V (s; k,A) = min
(d,e,c(A′),s(A′))
−
∑
A′
{βu (c (A′)) + βV (s (A′) ; k (A′) , A′)} p (A′|A) (10)
subject to the constraints
qdk + rek − s ≤ 0 (11)
c (A′)− λ (A′) dk ≤ 0 (12)
c (A′) + s (A′)− (λ (A′) + µ (A′)) dk −R (A′) ek − pi (A′) ≤ 0. (13)
We assume that V (·; k,A) is concave and C1, so that the optimal portfolio is determined
by the first order conditions of the consumer’s problem.
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Proposition 2. At any state (k,A), consumers will choose d = e = 1 if and only if
m0q =
∑
A′
{m1 (A′)λ (A′) +m2 (A′)µ (A′)} p (A′|A)
and
m0r =
∑
A′
m2 (A
′)R (A′) p (A′|A)
where m0 is the marginal utility of income in the afternoon when the decision is made
and m1 (A
′) (resp. m2 (A′)) is the marginal utility of income in the morning (resp.
afternoon) of the subsequent period, when state A′ occurs.
These equations determine the equilibrium prices and ensure that the consumers’
demand for deposits and equity clear the market, at each date and state. Importantly,
from the proof of Proposition 2, we have that m2(A
′) ≤ m1(A′) for all A′, with the
inequality being strict when the constraint in (12) is binding, that is when the debt is
only used to finance consumption. This condition ensures that for bank’s debt is cheaper
than capital.
4.2 The bankers’ problem
From Proposition 1, the planner’s choice of z is determined by the first order condition
∑
A′
βu′ (c (A′))
δz
A′
F ′
( z
A′
)
p (A′|A) =
∑
A′
`1 (A
′)
(
1− F
( z
A′
))
p (A′|A) ,
where `1 (A
′) is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (4). The first order condition
for the banker’s problem is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For any values of m1 (A
′) > 0 and m2 (A′) > 0, A′ ∈ A, the solution
of the banker’s problem satisfies the first order condition
∑
A′
[
m1 (A
′)
δz
A′
F ′
( z
A′
)
− (m1 (A′)−m2 (A′))
(
1− F
( z
A′
))]
p (A′|A) = 0
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The solution is uniquely determined if the summand
m1 (A
′)
δz
A′
F ′
( z
A′
)
− (m1 (A′)−m2 (A′))
(
1− F
( z
A′
))
is increasing in z, for each A′ ∈ A.
Comparing the first order condition from Proposition 3, with the first order condition
from the planner’s problem, we see that the two conditions are identical since
βu′ (c (A′)) = m1 (A′)
and
`1 (A
′) = m1 (A′)−m2 (A′) .
If the monotonicity condition of Proposition 3 is satisfied, this ensures that the bank
will choose the correct value of z at each date and state.
4.3 The producer’s problem
To induce the producers to produce the right amount of capital goods, it is sufficient to
set the price of capital goods so that v (A′)ϕ′ (I (A′)) = 1 for every A′. But in order to
show that the equilibrium can be decentralized, we need to check that this definition is
consistent with our definition of q and r.
Proposition 4. If q and r are defined by the first order conditions in Proposition 2 and
v = 1/ϕ′ (I), where I is the investment in state (k,A), then v = q + r.
This shows that our definitions of prices are consistent and the optimal solution of
the planner’s problem can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium.
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5 Regulated equilibrium
In our economy, the motivation for bank regulation is provided by a negative externality
created by the overall leverage of the banking sector. The externality is incorporated in
the utility function of the representative agent,
u (c)− ξzk,
where ξ > 0 is a parameter and zk is the overall leverage of the banking sector. Because
the cost of the externality is additively separable, it affects the consumer’s welfare but
does not affect the behavior of the consumers, bankers, and producers. Thus, it does
not change the definition of equilibrium. This fact is important because it allows us to
calculate equilibrium behavior and prices in the same way, whether there is an externality
or not. The cost is fully internalized, on the other hand, in the social planner’s optimal
allocation. As we will see below, the regulator can only restrict the leverage of the banks,
so his ability to achieve a constrained efficient allocation is limited and will generally
fall short of restoring the constrained efficient allocation.
While the constrained efficient solution to the planner’s problem shows the best that
can be achieved, it is not a realistic model of regulation. First, it requires the regulator
to control every aspect of the economy. There is no decentralization theorem to show
how decisions about consumption, investment, and capital structure could be left in the
hands of private decision makers, subject to regulation by a central authority. Second,
the solution to the planner’s problem may be so complex that it would be unrealistic to
expect it to be implemented by a regulator with limited information and computational
ability.
These two observations lead to us consider a reduced form model of a boundedly
rational regulator. Instead of trying to implement the constrained efficient allocation,
we assume the regulator imposes an upper bound on bank leverage, while leaving ev-
erything else to be determined as in the laissez faire equilibrium. The limitations on
the regulator’s information and computational ability are captured by an ad hoc rule
that approximates, more or less closely, the leverage policy that is part of the solution
to the planner’s problem. In the simplest case, we assume the regulator chooses a fixed
upper bound on leverage, denoted by z¯. A more sophisticated regulator might be able to
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choose the upper bound, z¯ (A), as a time invariant function of the productivity shock A.
Finally, the most sophisticated model of the regulator allows the upper bound z¯ (k,A)
to be a time invariant function of the state (k,A). Producers and consumers are not
directly affected by this regulation; only the banker’s behavior is directly constrained.
Apart from the leverage constraint, the banker’s decision problem is essentially the same
as described in Section 2.5. In each state (k,A), the banker chooses the value of leverage
z to maximize
∑
A′
[
m1 (A
′)
(
A′
∫ z
A′
0
(1− δ) θdF + z
(
1− F
( z
A′
)))
+
m2 (A
′)A′
∫ Z
z
A′
(
θ − z
A′
)
dF
]
p (A′|A)
subject to the constraint z ≤ z¯ (k,A), where z¯ (k,A) is exogenously given.8 Apart
from this change in the banker’s problem, the definition of a regulated equilibrium is
essentially the one given in Section 2.8.
To calculate the regulated equilibrium, we use a variation of the method described
in Section 4. We begin by setting up a planner’s problem to represent the behavior of
consumers, producers and bankers. As in Section 4, the “planner” ignores the negative
externality. The difference, now, is that the “planner” is subject to the upper bound
on leverage, z¯ (k,A), which he treats as an exogenous constraint. The addition of the
leverage constraint is, in fact, the only change in the planner’s problem. Thus, the
planner’s dynamic programming problem is as follows:
V (k,A) = max
(c,I,k,z)
∑
A′∈A
β {u (c (A′)) + V (k (A′) , A′)} p (A′|A)
subject to the constraints
(c, I,k, z) ≥ 0,
z ≤ z¯ (k,A) ,
c (A′) ≤ λ (A′) k, for any A′ ∈ A,
8To simplify the discussion, we deal explicitly with the case where the upper bound is contingent on
the state (k,A). The other two cases, where the upper bound is either a constant z¯ or a function z¯ (A)
of the productivity shock, are obtained as special cases.
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c (A′) + I (A′) ≤ A′k
∫ Z
0
θdF − A′k
∫ z
A′
0
δθdF, for any A′ ∈ A,
k (A′) ≤ (1− γ) k + ϕ (I (A′)) , for any A′ ∈ A.
Notice that the value function V (k,A) depends only on the state (k,A) because the
leverage constraint z¯ (k,A) is independent of time. The solution of this dynamic pro-
gramming problem provides us with a stochastic process {(ct, It, kt, zt)} which can then
be decentralized using the same method as in Section 4, that is, by backing out the
equilibrium prices {(qt, rt, vt)} using the first-order conditions for the consumer’s and
producer’s problems.
For our numerical results, we have investigated four versions of the regulated equilib-
rium. In the first two, the maximum leverage is assumed to be a constant, z¯, independent
of k and A. In these simulations, we assume that z¯ = 0.55 and z¯ = 0.53. The first value
is the average steady value of leverage in the constrained efficient allocation, when there
is no aggregate uncertainty. The slightly lower value, z¯ = 0.53, is used to test the sen-
sivity of the equilibrium to a tightening of the constraint. The non-contingent policy
does a reasonable job in the model with no aggregate uncertainty, but obviously will not
do as well when there are aggregate productivity shocks. In the third experiment, we
allow the maximum leverage to be a function z¯ (A) of the aggregate productivity shock
A. The value of z¯ (A) is set equal to the conditional mean leverage in the constrained
efficient allocation, for each value of A. In the fourth model of regulation, we allow the
maximum leverage to be a function z¯ (k,A) of the state (k,A).
Although we refer to the rules z¯, z¯ (A), and z¯ (k,A) as “models” of the regulator,
there is in fact no optimization going on. We have simply chosen rules that approximate
the leverage observed in the constrained efficient allocation. Even if we take as given the
form of the rule, for example, assume that maximum leverage is a constant z¯, the policy
may not be optimal in a decentralized economy. Consumers, bankers, and producers
are making decisions that may be sub-optimal. A regulator who takes into account the
impact of z¯ on private decisions (about consumption, investment, etc.) might be able
to do better. For all these reasons, the “models” of regulation we are analyzing here are
quite ad hoc. Nonetheless, it is interesting to see how close one can come to the first
best using such simple, ad hoc rules.
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6 Results
The results we present in this section are based on a numerical solution of the equilibrium
in different regulatory scenarios.
6.1 Numerical methods
The results are based on the numerical solution of the planner’s program described in
Section 5, which gives the optimal state-contingent allocation (c, I,k, z), and then using
such allocation and Propositions 2 and 4 to derive the price of bank’s securities and
of capital goods. An important conceptual issue from Proposition 2 is that while we
can calculate m1 and m2 as a function of future wealth s(A
′), there is no abvious way
of deriving m0 as a function of s. This issue is addressed by exploiting the recursive
structure of the planner’s program, and therefore, if ψt+1 = m2 is clearly determined at
all possible levels of s(A′), then m0 is found as ψt as a function of s.
To solve the planner’s program numerically, we specify the model as follows. The
utility function, including the negative externality induced by the leverage of the banking
sector, is
u(c) =
c1−α − 1
1− α − ξzk for α ∈]0, 1[ and u(c) = log c− ξzk for α = 1,
and the production function is ϕ(I) = Iη for η ∈]0, 1[. We assume that the distribution
of θ is a generalized uniform with cumulative function F (θ) =
(
θ
Z
)m
, with m ≥ 1 and
support [0, Z].
We solve the regulator’s dynamic program using a value function iteration approach
on a discrete grid of states. In particular, for the case with no aggregate uncertainty, we
set nk = 601 levels of kt as{
k, k(1− γ)1/16, k(1− γ)2/16, . . . , k(1− γ)nk/16}
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with k = 22, while the optimization is based on nz = 601 discrete levels of z in the
interval [0, Z].9
For the model with aggregate uncertainty, we define the discrete-state macroeconomic
shock A by discretizing a log-AR(1) process, logA′ = κ logA + σε′, where ε are i.i.d.
shocks drawn from a Normal distribution N (0, 1), truncated over a bounded support,
[A,A], where the bounds are set at three times the unconditional standard deviation of
logA. We discretize A with nA = 5 points using the method of Tauchen (1986). The
optimization with respect to contingent consumption is made by an exhaustive search
over a discrete grid of consumption levels with nC = 201 points. Due to the increased
size of the grid of states in the case with aggregate uncertainty, we adopt a discretization
based on nk = 151 levels of kt{
k, k(1− γ)1/2, k(1− γ)2/2, . . . , k(1− γ)nk/2}
with k = 29 and in the optimization nz = 121 discrete levels of zt.
The numerical results are based on the baseline parameters Z = 1, m = 5, κ = 0.90,
σ = 0.04, β = 0.95, δ = 0.10, η = 0.48, γ = 0.12, α = 0.70, and ξ = 0.07. While
we choose these parameters for the purpose of illustrating the properties of the model,
the qualitative conclusions we draw here below are general. Results are available upon
request.
6.2 Intertemporal substitution
We begin by looking at some features of the model that are most easily seen and under-
stood in the context of an economy with no aggregate uncertainty. For this purpose we
set the productivity parameter A = 1 at all dates. One interesting feature of the model
that can be illustrated in this case is the intertemporal substitution effect. Because of
the negative externality associated with high leverage, we intuitively expect that lever-
age will be too high under laissez faire, but this is not always true. There are times
when the optimal leverage will be lower than the laissez faire level and times when it
will be higher.
9In the case with no aggregate uncertainty, the liquidity constraint in (4) holds as equality, and so
optimal consumption is determined by the choice of z.
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Figure 1 shows the policy functions for leverage, consumption and investment. These
policy functions are the solutions of the dynamic programming problems corresponding
to the laissez faire equilibrium and the constrained optimum. We can see that there is a
capital level kˆ such that,10 for values of k below kˆ, leverage is higher in the constrained
optimum and lower in the laissez faire equilibrium. For values of k higher than kˆ, the
inequality is reversed. Correspondingly, consumption is higher and investment is lower
in the constrained optimum for k less than kˆ. Conversely, consumption is lower and
investment higher in the constrained optimum for k greater than kˆ. The intuition for
this is simple. The negative externality is a linear function of deposits, whereas utility
is concave in the level of consumption. When the capital stock is low (resp. high),
the marginal utility of consumption is high (resp. low), whereas the marginal negative
externality of deposits is constant. For this reason, the optimal policy increases leverage
relative to the laissez faire equilibrium when capital is low and reduces leverage when
capital is high.
The comparison of policy functions does not tell the whole story, however, because
the economy grows at different rates under laissez faire and the constrained optimum,
so the capital stocks will be different. Figure 2 shows the long run growth paths of the
laissez faire and constrained efficient economies. Initially, the capital stock grows faster
under laissez faire but, eventually, it is overtaken by the constrained optimum. We can
see the reason for this if we look at leverage. There is a date tˆ (in our case equal to 20),
such that leverage is higher under the constrained efficient policy for t < tˆ and it is lower
for t > tˆ. As a result, consumption is initially higher in the constrained optimum, but
the laissez faire economy overtakes it because its capital stock is growing faster. When
leverage on the constrained efficient path drops below leverage on the laissez faire path,
however, the constrained optimum starts to grow faster and eventually its consumption
overtakes consumption on the laissez faire path. This guarantees that, in the long run,
the capital stock and consumption will both be higher under the constrained efficient
policy, even though leverage is lower than in the laissez faire equilibrium. In short,
the constrained efficient policy trades lower consumption in the medium run for higher
consumption in the short and long run.
Figures 3 and 4 show the corresponding policy functions and growth paths for the
laissez faire equilibrium and a variety of regulated equilibria. In a regulated equilibrium,
10While in the current choice of parameters k̂ = 16, the behaviour we describe is general.
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the maximum leverage z¯ is imposed exogenously, but the remaining endogenous variables
are determined, in the usual way, by optimizing behavior and market clearing conditions.
In one case, we set the maximum leverage z¯ equal to 0.55, the leverage attained in the
constrained efficient steady state. In another, we reduce the maximum leverage to
0.53, to test the sensitivity of the equilibrium to regulation. In a third, we assume the
maximum leverage is a function z¯ (k) of the capital stock and set it equal to the leverage
chosen in the constrained efficient allocation.11 In the first two cases, the leverage
constraint does not bind until the equilibrium is close to the steady state. In the third
case, the equilibrium path approximates the constrained efficient path. One interesting
feature is that the tighter regulation z¯ = 0.53 leads to larger deviations from the optimum
than the looser constraint z¯ = 0.55. In particular, the steady state capital stock shown
in Figure 4 is much larger than the other three, which are relatively close together.
This suggests that relatively small changes in the maximum leverage can have large
effects in the long run. The excess capital accumulation, which occurs because of the
restriction of consumption, is inefficient in two ways. First, consumption is lower along
the transition to the steady state; second, although consumption is slightly higher in the
steady state, most of the extra output goes to investment required to replace depreciating
capital: although the steady state capital stock is 5% higher on the tightly regulated
path, compared to the constrained efficient path, consumption is only 2% higher, while
investment is 10% higher. Welfare could be increased by reducing investment, allowing
the capital stock to depreciate, and increasing consumption. By contrast, the steady
state consumption levels on the other growth paths (laissez faire, loosely regulated, and
contingently regulated) are almost identical to the constrained efficient path.
6.3 Cost of debt and equity
The model allows us to characterize the relative cost of debt and equity. Figure 5 shows
the net returns on debt and equity along the laissez faire equilibrium path. Both are
quite high when the capital stock is low and fall progressively as capital stock rises.
This fall in rates of return cannot be due to diminishing returns in the banking sector,
because the bank technology is linear. Instead, it results from the slowing rate of growth
11Although the maximum leverage z (k) equals the actual leverage in the constrained efficient case,
the other endogenous variables may be distorted. In other words, the regulated equilibrium will not
necessarily be constrained efficient.
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dictated by diminishing returns to scale in the production of capital goods. The (gross)
return on equity is denoted by 1 + ρt and defined by
12
1 + ρt =
Rt+1
rt
where rt is the price of equity in the afternoon of period t and Rt+1 is the total return
to equity in the afternoon of period t + 1. As we showed in Proposition 2, the price of
equity satisfies the following first order condition for the consumer’s problem
ψtrt = βψt+1Rt+1,
where ψt denotes the marginal utility of one unit of the consumption good in the after-
noon of date t. Solving for rt and substituting the expression in the equation for ρt, we
obtain
1 + ρt =
ψt
βψt+1
. (14)
The rates of return on equity are illustrated in Figure 6. The returns on equity
are similar for the laissez faire equilibrium and the three regulated equilibria. All four
returns are highest when the capital stock is lowest and decline over time as the capital
stock increases and the economy converges to a steady state. The decline in the rates of
return is a corollary of the slowing growth rate as the economy approaches the steady
state. When consumption is low and the growth rate is high, we expect ψt/ψt+1 to be
high and when consumption is high and the growth rate is low, we expect ψt/ψt+1 to be
low. Then equation (14) implies a fall in the return on equity. As the economy converges
to the steady state, ψt/ψt+1 will converge to one and equation (14) implies that 1 + ρ
will converge to 1/β. This is what happens in any neoclassical growth model, of course,
so there is nothing surprising in this. In Figure 6, we see that the return on equity
converges to 0.05, which is consistent with our parameterization β = 0.95.
The return on deposits are a different story, however. Although the deposit rate is
lower than the return on equity and declines over time in each case, there are noticeable
differences even in the limit. The behavior of the return on deposits can be explained by
12Because we are considering the case A′ ≡ 1, we do not need to calculate the expectations with
respect to A′.
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two factors, the rate of growth and the tightness of the leverage constraint. The (gross)
expected return on debt is denoted by 1 + it and defined by
1 + it =
λt+1 + µt+1
qt
where qt satisfies the first order condition from the consumer’s problem shown in Propo-
sition 2,
ψtqt = β {u′ (ct+1)λt+1 + ψt+1µt} .
In our simulations, the value of µt+1 is very small because the probability of a bank
defaulting is quite low, generally around 5%. If we ignore this term, the return on
deposits can be approximated by
1 + it ≈
λt+1ψt
βu′ (ct+1)λt+1
=
ψt
βu′ (ct+1)
.
The expression on the right is illustrated in Figure 7. Comparing the graph of it in
Figure 6 with the graph of ψt/ βu
′ (ct+1) in Figure 7, this seems to be a reasonable
approximation.
When the liquidity constraint is not binding, ψt = u
′ (ct), and
1 + it ≈
u′ (ct)
βu′ (ct+1)
.
In this case, which occurs when the capital stock is low and the growth rate is relatively
high, the return on deposits and equity will be similar. As the economy grows and gets
closer to the steady state, the leverage constraint begins to bind, ψt < u
′ (ct) ≈ u′ (ct+1),
and so the return on deposits, 1+i, will fall below the return on equity, 1+ρ. The tighter
the leverage constraint, the lower the return on deposits. The most striking feature is
that the deposit rate in the regulated equilibrium with z¯ = 0.53 is negative and much
lower than the rates in the other three cases. Again, the interest rate it seems to be very
sensitive to a (modest) tightening of the upper bound on leverage, whereas consumption
does not differ much between the equilibria with z¯ = 0.55 and z¯ = 0.53 because the
tighter leverage constraint leads to an inefficiently higher investment and capital stock.
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6.4 Capital structure dynamics
In the version of the model with no aggregate productivity shocks—and hence no ag-
gregate uncertainty—fixing the maximum leverage at z¯ = 0.55 is a reasonably good
approximation to an optimal policy (Figure 3). But once aggregate productivity shocks
are introduced, we must allow for contingent regulation. Figure 8 illustrates the con-
strained efficient and laissez faire paths for a sequence of aggregate shocks. Two features
of the simulation are very clear. First, leverage is procyclical in the sense that an increase
in productivity (A) leads to an increase in leverage (z). This is true for both the laissez
faire equilibrium and the constrained efficient allocation.13 Second, the constrained ef-
ficient leverage is always lower than the laissez faire equilibrium. This is quite intuitive
because of the presence of the negative externality, which the planner internalizes and
the bankers do not.
In fact, we can go further and say that the constrained efficient policy is “coun-
tercyclical,” in the following sense: the constrained efficient leverage is proportionately
smaller compared to the laissez faire leverage in the upswing of the cycle, when A is high,
than it is in the downswing, when A is low. This is easily seen in the bottom panel of
Figure 8, which shows the ratio between the constrained efficient leverage and the laissez
faire leverage. This shows clearly that the ratio is countercyclical. Although Figure 8
is calculated for a particular sequence of shocks, the pattern is in fact quite general.
The table below shows the conditional expected value of the same ratio, calculated by
averaging over the entire ergodic set, conditioning on the value of the productivity shock
A.
A zCE/zLF
1.3169 .9527
1.1476 .9680
1.000 .9808
0.8714 .9907
0.7593 .9978
In the lowest two states, the laissez faire leverage is almost the same, on average, as the
constrained efficient leverage, but it is 2% per cent higher than the constrained efficient
13Nun˜o and Thomas (2017), in an analysis of the cyclical fluctuations of the leverage ratio of US
financial intermediaries in the post-war period, find that leverage has been positively correlated with
assets and GDP.
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leverage in the middle state, more than 3% higher in the second highest state, and about
5% higher in the highest state. In this relative sense, constrained efficiency prescribes
that leverage be reduced more in the upswing of the cycle than in the downswing.
Figure 9 shows simulations of the laissez faire and regulated equilibria for the same
sequence of productivity shocks. Obviously, the two equilibria with constant maximum
leverage z¯ = 0.55 and z¯ = 0.53 cannot show the same fluctuations in leverage as the
other two. In fact the constraints are binding for the three highest states, so it is only in
the lowest two states that there is any variation in leverage. The contingent regulated
equilibrium, on the other hand, exhibits very similar leverage and consumption to the
laissez faire (and therefore, the constrained efficient) case. Recall that the limits on
leverage are assumed to be functions of the state. More precisely, z¯ (A) is set equal to
the average constrained efficient leverage in state A, where the average is computed over
the ergodic set. This suggests that the state-dependent leverage constraint may be a
good approximation to the constrained efficient policy. This conjecture is given support
by the correlation analysis in Table 1. The correlation between the state A and the
leverage ratio z in the constrained efficient allocation, calculated over the ergodic set,
is 1.00. This suggests that there is relatively little variation in z within a given state,
that is, the optimal leverage is approximately a function of A. The correlation between
A and z is also 1.00 in the equilibrium with contingent regulation, which suggests that
the constraint z (A) is binding almost all the time. More surprisingly, the correlation
between A and z in the laissez faire equilibrium is also very high, 0.99. When regulation
takes the form of a fixed limit z¯ = 0.55, on the other hand, the correlation between A
and z is much lower, 0.76 (and even more so if such limit is z¯ = 0.53). Of course, there is
no correlation between A and z when the constraint is binding. It is only in those states
where z < z¯ that there can be any correlation between A and z. So the correlation that
we do observe is explained by the variation in unregulated leverage.
6.5 Model dynamics
The dynamic properties of the model are summarized by the impulse response functions
in Figures 11–14. These figures show the average response of the endogenous variables to
a one standard deviation change in the productivity shock At+1. It is important to bear
in mind two facts when interpreting the impulse response functions. First, the value of
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the productivity shock changes for only one period, but the responses are determined by
the policy functions that anticipate the shock’s serial correlation. Thus, an increase in
productivity will give rise to expectation of continued high productivity in the near future
and that will influence current decisions about consumption and investment. After the
initial shock, the dynamics are driven solely by the predetermined values of the capital
stock k and leverage z. The initial increase in the productivity shock has no effect
on subsequent values of the productivity shock. Second, when the productivity shock
changes, the value of leverage z has already been chosen. The predetermined leverage
has asymmetric effects depending on whether the productivity A increases or decreases.
If productivity increases, consumers may want to consume more, but find themselves
constrained by the predetermined level of deposits. If the shock decreases and consumers
want to consume less, there is nothing to stop them from reducing consumption. This
asymmetry has implications for investment. When consumption is constrained after an
increase in the productivity shock, the extra output must be invested.
We can get a better sense of the response of investment and consumption to pro-
ductivity shocks from Figure 10. The top panel shows us the level of consumption as
function of the capital stock following a productivity increase (solid lines) and decrease
(dotted lines), for the constrained efficient allocation and the laissez faire equilibrium.
In the constrained efficient case, the difference in consumption is small. The difference
is somewhat larger in the laissez faire case, but it is small compared to the impact
on investment, shown in the lower panel, where we see, in both cases, investment fol-
lowing a productivity increase is much higher than investment following a productivity
decrease. This shows that the impact of a change in productivity is mainly absorbed by
changes in investment. When productivity rises, consumption is constrained by deposits
so increased output flows into investment. When productivity falls, on the other hand,
deposits do not prevent consumption from falling but it is either maintained (in the
constrained efficient case) or slightly reduced (in the laissez faire equilibrium). Again,
investment absorbs most of the impact.
Figure 11 shows the effect of an increase in A on the laissez faire equilibrium and
constrained efficient allocation in the ergodic set. The leverage at t = 1 is determined
at t = 0, so the spike in leverage at t = 1 reflects the response to the increase in A and,
more importantly, the expectation of a higher than normal value of A in the future. At
values of t > 1, it is clear that both expectations and leverage have returned to normal.
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Consumption initially rises only slightly, in the constrained efficient allocation, be-
cause it is constrained by the level of deposits chosen at t = 0. The spike in consumption
occurs at t = 2, after deposits have been increased at t = 1. By contrast, there is no
spike in consumption in the laissez faire equilibrium and the path of consumption is
much smoother. In both cases, consumption remains somewhat elevated for a long time
because the capital stock is elevated.
Investment, unlike consumption, rises as soon as the productivity shock increases at
t = 1. Consumption is constrained by deposits, so all the increased output goes into
investment. As soon as the productivity returns to “normal,” investment falls, somewhat
more sharply in the case of the constrained efficient allocation than in the case of laissez
faire. Thereafter, investment returns to “normal” and the capital stock, after jumping
up at t = 2, gradually declines as a result of depreciation.
Figure 12 shows the same information for the laissez faire and regulated equilibria.
The qualitative features are similar to those in Figure 11, except that, in the regulated
equilibria with non-contingent upper bounds on leverage, there is no spike in consump-
tion. The equilibrium with state contingent regulation, on the other hand, resembles
the constrained efficient allocation and exhibits a spike in leverage and consumption.
As we have already noted, there is an asymmetry between the effects of an increase
and a decrease in the productivity shock. A decrease in A is expected to reduce con-
sumption and investment, but consumption is not constrained by deposits. Nonetheless,
there are significant differences between the laissez faire equilibrium and constrained
efficient allocation in both the timing and size of responses. Figure 13 shows impulse
response functions for a one standard deviation decline in A for the laissez faire equi-
librium and the constrained efficient allocation. In both cases, the leverage z changes
only after a one period delay and then returns to normal. Consumption, however, drops
sharply at t = 1 in the laissez faire equilibrium but, in the constrained efficient case,
does not drop significantly until t = 2. In both cases, consumption returns to normal
after t = 2. Investment responds to the negative shock at t = 1 and then rebounds at
t = 2, after which investment returns to normal in both cases. The profile of the capital
stock is different in the two cases, however, because the drop in investment at t = 1 is
larger in the constrained efficient allocation, so the capital stock takes longer to recover.
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Figure 14 shows the impulse response functions for the regulated equilibria. The two
equilibria with non-contingent regulation have quite similar responses, except that the
one with the tighter constraint, z¯ = 0.53, has a slight drop in leverage and consumption
at t = 1 and a slightly weaker recovery in the capital stock following t = 3. The
equilibrium with contingent regulation, not surprisingly, looks similar to the constrained
efficient allocation.
As we explained above, a change in productivity has immediate and asymmetric ef-
fects because leverage, z , is predetermined, but this effect disappears as soon as leverage
is adjusted, unless, of course, leverage cannot be adjusted because of a binding leverage
constraint. This suggests that the impact of productivity shocks may be quite different
in the medium term depending on the kind of regulation imposed. We find strong evi-
dence of this in Table 1, which shows the correlation of productivity (A) with leverage
(z), consumption (c), and investment (I), for the constrained efficient allocation and
the laissez faire and regulated equilibria. The different cases fall into two groups. On
the one hand, we have three cases where leverage is free to vary over the medium term:
the constrained efficient allocation, the laissez faire equilibrium, and the contingently
regulated equilibrium. The correlations across this group are very similar. Leverage is
perfectly correlated with productivity and the correlations of consumption and invest-
ment with productivity are very high, though consumption is more highly correlated
than investment. On the other other hand, we have the two regulated equilibria with
constant leverage constraints (z¯ = 0.55, 0.53). In this group, the correlation coeffi-
cients are quite different. The correlation of leverage with productivity is much lower, of
course, because leverage cannot vary when the constraint is binding. The correlation of
consumption with productivity is also lower and is very similar to the leverage correla-
tion, suggesting that consumption is normally determined by deposits. The correlation
of investment with productivity, on the other hand, is somewhat higher than what we
observe in the other group and much higher than the correlations of consumption and
leverage with productivity. In effect, non-contingent regulation extends the short term
asymmetric effect of predetermined leverage, which we discussed above, into the medium
term. As a result, investment has to absorb the impact of increases in productivity when
consumption is constrained by (regulated) leverage.
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Figure 1: No aggregate shock - Constrained efficient and laissez faire alloca-
tion. For the model with no aggregate uncertainty, we show the equilibrium allocation,
(zt, ct+1, It+1) for a unit of capital stock, for the constrained efficient (black lines) and
the laissez faire (blue lines) cases, against the state variable kt.
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Figure 2: No aggregate shock - Equilibrium dynamics. For the model with no
aggregate uncertainty starting from the lowest value of capital towards the steady state,
we show the evolution of the equilibrium allocation, for the constrained efficient (black
lines) case and the laissez faire (blue lines) case.
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Figure 3: No aggregate shock - Effect of regulation. We show the state-contingent
equilibrium allocation, (zt, ct+1, It+1) per unit of capital stock, against the state variable
kt. We consider the laissez faire equilibrium (blue lines), a non-contingent regulation
(magenta lines), for which we assume either z = 0.55 (solid magenta lines) or z = 0.53
(dotted magenta lines). Finally, we consider a state-contingent regulation with upper
bound z¯(k) (green lines).
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Figure 4: No aggregate shock - Regulation dynamics. We show the evolution of
the equilibrium allocation from a model starting from the lowest value of capital towards
the steady state. We consider the laissez faire (blue lines), the regulated equilibrium
(magenta lines) with either z = 0.55 (solid magenta lines) or z = 0.53 (dotted magenta
lines), and the state-contingent regulation with upper bound z¯(k) (green lines).
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Figure 5: No aggregate shock - Return dynamics. For the model with no aggregate
uncertainty starting from the lowest value of capital towards the steady state, we show
the evolution of the return on bank’s equity (solid line) and deposits (dotted line), for
the laissez faire equilibrium.
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Figure 6: No aggregate shock - Regulation and return dynamics. We show
the evolution of the return on bank’s equity (topb panel) and deposits (bottom panel)
from a model starting from the lowest value of capital towards the steady state. We
consider the laissez faire (blue lines), the regulated equilibrium (magenta lines) with
either z = 0.55 (solid magenta lines) or z = 0.53 (dotted magenta lines), and the state-
contingent regulation with upper bound z¯(k) (green lines).
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Figure 7: No aggregate shock - dynamics of discount factor. For the model with
no aggregate uncertainty starting from the lowest value of capital towards the steady
state, we show the evolution of the ratio ψt/u
′(ct+1). We consider four cases: laissez faire
(blue lines), non-contingent regulation, in which either z = 0.55 (solid magenta line) or
z = 0.53 (dotted magenta line). Finally, we consider the case with state-contingent
regulation z(k) (green lines).
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Figure 8: Capital structure dynamics in the business cycle. For the model with
aggregate uncertainty, this figure shows the steady-state evolution of bank leverage in
response to aggregate shock, At (upper panel) for the constrained efficient case (black
line) and the laissez faire (blue line) equilibrium. In the bottom panel, we report the
path of the ratio zCEt /z
LF
t . The simulation is done for the baseline parameters.
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Figure 9: Capital structure dynamics in the business cycle with regulation.
For the model with aggregate uncertainty, this figure shows the steady-state evolution
of bank leverage of the model in response to the systematic shock, At, for the laissez
faire economy (blue lines), the regulated equilibrium with non-contingent restrictions on
deposits (for this case, we assume either z = 0.55 – solid magenta line – or z = 0.53 –
dotted magenta line), and the regulated equilibrium with state-contingent restrictions
on deposits (green line). The simulation is done for the baseline parameters.
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Table 1: Correlation of allocation with business cycle. For the model with ag-
gregate shocks, this table shows correlations of the allocation (z, c, I) with A. Starting
from a random draw of the initial capital, k0, we simulate 100 economies for 1050 years
using the law of motion of the state variables (kt, At) resulting from the solution of the
general equilibrium problem, and drop the first 50 years to eliminate the dependence
on the initial state, (k0, A0). We consider the constrained efficient economy, the laissez
faire economy, the regulated economy with a state-contingent constraint on leverage at
z¯(A), and the regulated economy with a non-contingent constraint on leverage at either
z = 0.55 or at z = 0.53. The simulation is done using the baseline parameters.
z c I
constrained efficient 1.00 0.89 0.82
laissez faire 0.99 0.89 0.84
z < z¯(A) 1.00 0.89 0.83
z < .55 0.76 0.75 0.87
z < .53 0.72 0.73 0.89
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Figure 10: Allocation response to a change of productivity. This figure shows
equilibrium consumption and investment per unit of capital stock, when the optimal
(kt, At)-contingent zt has been already decided, against the state variable kt, with At
equal to the unconditional average of A. We assume either At+1 < At (dotted lines) or
At+1 > At (solid lines). We consider the constrained efficient optimum (black lines) and
the laissez faire equilibrium (blue lines).
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Figure 11: Impulse responses to an upward shock on A. This figure plots the
impulse response of the equilibrium allocation, (z, c, I, k), in response to an upward shock
of one standard deviation on At at time t = 1. There are two model specifications: the
constrained efficient (black lines) and the laissez faire (blue lines). We present deviations
with respect to the pre-shock steady-state level of the variable.
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Figure 12: Impulse responses to an upward shock on A - regulated economies.
This figure plots the impulse response of the equilibrium allocation, (z, c, I, k), in re-
sponse to an upward shock of one standard deviation on At at time t = 1. There are
three model specifications: the laissez faire (blue lines), the regulated equilibrium with
non-contingent restrictions on deposits (for this case, we assume either z = 0.55 – solid
magenta line – or z = 0.53 – dotted magenta line), and the regulated equilibrium with
state-contingent restrictions on leverage z¯(A) (green line). We present deviations with
respect to the pre-shock steady-state level of the variable.
0 5 10 15 20
%
 D
ev
0
2
4
6
8
10
Leverage (z)
0 5 10 15 20
%
 D
ev
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Consumption
time
0 5 10 15 20
%
 D
ev
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Investment
time
0 5 10 15 20
%
 D
ev
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Capital stock
laissez faire
z < .55
z < .53
z < z(A)
55
Figure 13: Impulse responses to a downward shock on A. This figure plots the
impulse response of the equilibrium allocation, (z, c, I, k), in response to a downward
shock of one standard deviation on At at time t = 1. There are two model specifications:
the constrained efficient (black lines) and the laissez faire (blue lines). We present
deviations with respect to the pre-shock steady-state level of the variable.
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Figure 14: Impulse responses to a downward shock on A - regulated economies.
This figure plots the impulse response of the equilibrium allocation, (z, c, I, k), in re-
sponse to a downward shock of one standard deviation on At at time t = 1. There are
three model specifications: the laissez faire (blue lines), the regulated equilibrium with
non-contingent restrictions on deposits (for this case, we assume either z = 0.55 – solid
magenta line – or z = 0.53 – dotted magenta line), and the regulated equilibrium with
state-contingent restrictions on leverage z¯(A) (green line). We present deviations with
respect to the pre-shock steady-state level of the variable.
0 5 10 15 20
%
 D
ev
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
Leverage (z)
0 5 10 15 20
%
 D
ev
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Consumption
time
0 5 10 15 20
%
 D
ev
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Investment
time
0 5 10 15 20
%
 D
ev
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Capital stock
laissez faire
z < .55
z < .53
z < z(A)
57
A Internet Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let the total value of deposits in state A′ be denoted by D (A′) and defined by putting
D (A′, z) ≡ A′k (1− δ)
∫ z
A′
0
θdF + zk
(
1− F
( z
A′
))
and let total output in state A′ be denoted by Y (A′, z) and defined by
Y (A′, z) ≡ A′k
(∫ Z
0
θdF − δ
∫ z
A′
0
θdF
)
.
The constraint (5) will always hold as an equality at the optimum, so we can use the
constraint to solve for I (A′) as
I (A′) ≡ A′k
∫ Z
0
θdF − A′k
∫ z
A′
0
δθdF − c (A′)
= Y (A′, z)− c (A′)
for each value of A′. Then the constraints (4) and (6) can be written as
c (A′)−D (A′, z) ≤ 0, for each A′ ∈ A (15)
k (A′)− (1− γ) k − ϕ (Y (A′, z)− c (A′)) ≤ 0, for each A′ ∈ A. (16)
The Lagrange multipliers corresponding to (15) and (16) are denoted by `1 (A
′) and
`2 (A
′), respectively. The Lagrangean for the dynamic program can be written in canon-
ical form as follows:
L (c,k, z) =∑
A′
{−β [u (c (A′)) + V (k (A′) , A′)] + `1 (A′) [c (A′)−D (A′, z)] +
`2 (A
′) [k (A′)− (1− γ) k − ϕ (Y (A′, z)− c (A′))]} p (A′|A) .
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The first-order condition for c (A′) is
−βu′ (c (A′)) + `1 (A′) + `2 (A′)ϕ′ (I (A′)) = 0, ∀A′ ∈ A,
and the first order condition for k (A′)
−β ∂
∂k
V (k (A′) , A′) + `2 (A′) = 0, ∀A′ ∈ A,
which establishes equations (7) and (8) in Proposition 1.
The first order condition for z is
∑
A′
`1 (A
′)
[
− ∂
∂z
D (A′, z)
]
p (A′|A) +
∑
A′
`2 (A
′) [−ϕ′ (Y (A′, z)− c (A′))] ∂
∂z
Y (A′, z) p (A′|A) = 0.
From the definitions of D (A′, z) and Y (A′, z), direct calculation shows that
∂
∂z
D (A′, z) = A′k (1− δ)
( z
A′
)
F ′
( z
A′
) 1
A′
+ k
(
1− F
( z
A′
))
− zkF ′
( z
A′
) 1
A′
= −δk
( z
A′
)
F ′
( z
A′
)
+ k
(
1− F
( z
A′
))
and
∂
∂z
Y (A′, z) = −δA′k
( z
A′
)
F ′
( z
A′
) 1
A′
= −δk
( z
A
)
F ′
(
d
A′
)
.
Substituting these expressions into the first-order condition above and dividing by k we
obtain
∑
A′
`1 (A
′)
[
δz
A′
F ′
( z
A′
)
−
(
1− F
( z
A′
))]
p (A′|A) +
∑
A′
`2 (A
′)ϕ′ (I (A′))
δz
A′
F ′
( z
A′
)
p (A′|A) = 0.
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The first order condition for k (A′) implies that `2 (A′) = β ∂∂kV (k (A
′) , A′) and substi-
tuting this expression into the first order condition for c (A′) gives us
βu′ (c (A′))− `1 (A′) = β ∂
∂k
V (k (A′) , A′)ϕ′ (I (A′)) .
Then substituting for β ∂
∂k
V (k (A′) , A′)ϕ′ (I (A′)) in the first order condition for z gives
us
∑
A′
`1 (A
′)
[
δz
A′
F ′
( z
A′
)
−
(
1− F
( z
A′
))]
p (A′|A) +
∑
A′
[βu′ (c (A′))− `1 (A′)] δz
A′
F ′
( z
A′
)
p (A′|A) = 0,
which simplifies to
∑
A′
βu′ (c (A′))
δz
A′
F ′
( z
A′
)
p (A′|A) =
∑
A′
`1 (A
′)
(
1− F
( z
A′
))
p (A′|A) .
This establishes equation (9) and completes the proof of the proposition.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Writing the Lagrangean for the consumer’s problem defined in (10)–(13), we obtain
L (c, d, e, s) = −
∑
A′
{βu (c (A′)) + βV (s (A′) ; k (A′) , A′) +
`0 [qdk + rek − s] + `1 (A′) [c (A′)− λ (A′) dk] +
`2 (A
′) [c (A′) + s (A′)− (λ (A′) + µ (A′)) dk −R (A′) ek − pi (A′)]} p (A′|A) .
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The first-order conditions are as follows:
−βu′ (c (A′)) + `1 (A′) + `2 (A′) ≤ 0
−β ∂
∂s (A′)
V (s (A′) ; k (A′) , A′) + `2 (A′) ≤ 0
`0q −
∑
A′
{`1 (A′)λ (A′) + `2 (A′) [λ (A′) + µ (A′)]} p (A′|A) ≤ 0
`0r −
∑
A′
`2 (A
′)R (A′) p (A′|A) ≤ 0,
each with its own complementary slackness condition.
The optimal values of d and e are both positive, so we obtain the pricing equations
`0q =
∑
A′
{`1 (A′)λ (A′) + `2 (A′) [λ (A′) + µ (A′)]} p (A′|A)
and
`0r =
∑
A′
`2 (A
′)R (A′) p (A′|A) .
The conclusion of the proposition follows from the fact that `0 = m0, `1 (A
′) + `2 (A′) =
m1 (A
′) and `2 (A′) = m2 (A′).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The revenue received by a banker cannot exceed anZ so there is no loss of generality in
assuming that the face value of deposits satisfies 0 ≤ z ≤ anZ. The banker’s objective
function is continuous and must have a maximum in the interval [0, anZ]. If z = 0, the
derivative of the objective function is∑
A′
[m1 (A
′)−m2 (A′)] p (A′|A) > 0.
In fact, the marginal utility of consumption in the morning, m1 (A
′) is equal to βu′ (0),
which is infinite. So z = 0 cannot be an optimum. If z = anZ, the derivative is
∑
A′
m1 (A
′)
(
−δanZ
A′
)
F ′
(
anZ
A′
)
p (A′|A) < 0,
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because F ′
(
anZ
A′
)
> 0 if A′ < an, so z = anZ is not an optimum. The optimum must
therefore satisfy 0 < z < anZ. If the banker’s problem
max
z
∑
A′
{
m1 (A
′)
[
A′
∫ z
A′
0
(1− δ) θdF + z
(
1− F
( z
A′
))]
+
m2 (A
′)A′
∫ Z
z
A′
(
θ − z
A′
)
dF
}
p (A′|A)
has an interior solution 0 < z < anZ, it must satisfy the first order condition
∑
A′
{
m1 (A
′)
[
A′ (1− δ) z
A′
F ′
( z
A′
) 1
A′
− zF ′
( z
A′
) 1
A′
+
(
1− F
( z
A′
))]
−
m2 (A
′)
(
1− F
( z
A′
))}
p (A′|A) = 0.
Collecting like terms, this expression can be rewritten as
∑
A′
{
m1 (A
′)
(
−δz
A′
)
F ′
( z
A′
)
+ [m1 (A
′)−m2 (A′)]
(
1− F
( z
A′
))}
p (A′|A) = 0.
The first-order condition uniquely determines the value of z if the summand is increasing
in z.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Summing the two first order conditions in Proposition 2, we obtain
m0 (q + r) =
∑
A′
{m1 (A′)λ (A′) +m2 (A′)µ (A′) +m2 (A′)R (A′)} p (A′|A)
=
∑
A′
{m1 (A′)λ (A′) +m2 (A′) [Y (A′)− λ (A′)] +m2 (A′) v (A′) (1− δ)} p (A′|A)
=
∑
A′
β
{
u′ (c (A′))λ (A′) +
∂
∂k
V (k (A′) , A′)ϕ′ (I (A′))
[
Y (A′)
k
− λ (A′)
]
+
∂
∂k
V (k (A′) , A′) (1− δ)
}
p (A′|A) .
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The envelope theorem, applied to the planner’s problem, tells us that
∂
∂k
V (k,A) =
∑
A′
β
{
u′ (c (A′))λ (A′) +
∂
∂k
V (k (A′) , A′)ϕ′ (I (A′))
[
Y (A′)
k
− λ (A′)
]
+
∂
∂k
V (k (A′) , A′) (1− δ)
}
p (A′|A) ,
or
m0 (q + r) =
∂
∂k
V (k,A) .
From the first order conditions of the planner’s problem in Proposition 1, we know that
βu′ (c)− `1 = `2ϕ′ (I)
= β
∂
∂k
V (k,A)ϕ′ (I)
= β
∂
∂k
V (k,A)
1
v
.
Since βu′ (c) is the marginal utility of income in the morning, βu′ (c) − `1 must be the
marginal utility of money in the afternoon. Thus, β ∂
∂k
V (k,A) /v is equal to the marginal
utility of money m0 in the afternoon and it follows that q + r = v.
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